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COPULEMUS IN PACE:* A MEDITATION ON RAPE,
AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT TO SEX, AND SEXUAL
AUTONOMY
Dan Subotnik**
I asked him with my eyes to ask again yes and then
he asked me would I yes to say yes my mountain flower
and first I put my arms around him yes and drew him
down to me so he could feel my breasts all perfume
yes and his heart was going like mad and yes I said
yes I will Yes. (sic)
James Joyce 1

I. INTRODUCTION
Here is a rich irony to chew on: At a time when women’s political,
social, physical, and especially economic powers are at a 10,000-year
high, a movement to regulate sexual intercourse in this country is
growing, fueled by the notion that contemporary women can’t say “no.”
I am not making light of unwanted sex. Evidence of the physical
and psychological damage to women that results therefrom is
overwhelming. Neither am I suggesting that the test for a reform agenda
is whether it makes historical sense. Such tests are never more than
provisional; circumstances are always changing. With hard thinking,
moreover, the body politic can get wiser over time. I have refrained
* “Let us copulate in peace” or, optatively, “May we copulate in peace.” (Latin).
** Dan Subotnik is a professor at Touro Law School, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, and author of
TOXIC DIVERSITY: RACE, GENDER, AND LAW TALK IN AMERICA (2005). The author thanks Kate
Anderson, Cynthia Raskin Rocco, Roy Sturgeon, Leslie Wong, and, above all, his wife, and editor
and counselor par excellence, Rose Rosengard Subotnik. He would also like to thank Malisheia
Douglas, Katie Albrecht, and all the other Akron Law Review members who worked so hard on his
article and the Rape, Affirmative Consent, and Sexual Autonomy Symposium. Finally, the author
would like to thank Professor Jane Moriarty for organizing the symposium and his Dean, Lawrence
Raful, for generous summer support.
1. JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES 768 (1914). The passage from which the epigraph was taken has
come to be known as Molly Bloom’s Soliloquy.
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from ironing out the irony only to highlight the need for close scrutiny of
the revolutionary regulatory measure in question here, affirmative
consent.
What is affirmative consent? It is a rule of law proposed by a
number of male and female academics that would criminalize sexual
penetration not preceded by real and very clear consent; Molly Bloom’s
Soliloquy would normally satisfy the clear consent standard.. 2
Affirmative consent is designed to apply to “date rape” cases, the focus
of our discussion here, where the volitional elements may be murky.
Consider this story told by a young (black) woman not long ago: “I
had sex with a guy I met at a bus stop. I didn’t want to have sex with
him, but I felt like I had to because I came up to his apartment. . . . I
didn’t want to have sexual intercourse with just anyone, but in certain
situations I still had a hard time saying no.” 3 Affirmative consent could
conceivably solve the problem.
Affirmative consent is premised not only on presumed power
differentials in the very areas where women have actually gained power
in recent decades but also on the idea of male sexual rapacity, which
leads men either to ignore women’s words and body language or to just
torture them into evidence of consent. In legal terms, the proposed
criminal law rule would shift the definition of rape away from one that is
force-centered, the model used in most jurisdictions today, to one that is
consent-based.
Put this way, the proposal may seem totally
unobjectionable. In fact, as readers may already intuit from their own
experience, and as we shall see in detail later, affirmative consent would
create a tangle of problems.
To illustrate, briefly at this point, such regulation of an aspect of our
lives as intimate as copulation may well, given the varieties of sexual
experience, constitute a civil rights violation. If anal sex can apparently
be practiced free of special concern for whether the implied dominance
of one and submissiveness of the other problematizes a true “meeting of
the minds,” why not the genital variety?
Consigning the affirmative consent decision to feminist writers
(whether male or female) is especially risky. Rising up against
patriarchal power can be intoxicating; 4 it can distract even experienced
2. See id.
3. Siobhan Brooks, A Blackgirl Taking Control of Her Sexuality, in SEX & SINGLE GIRLS:
STRAIGHT AND QUEER WOMEN ON SEXUALITY 310, 315 (Lee Damsky ed., 2000).
4. “[B]oundary crossing, from safe circle into wilderness . . . [i]s the willingness to spoil a
good party and break an encompassing circle . . . . The transgression is dizzyingly intense, a
reminder of what it is to be alive.” PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 12930 (1991).
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academics from what many would say is good practice. Harvard’s motto
is “Veritas” not “Mutatio,” but, writes professor Joan Williams, “[M]y
goal is not to deliver the truth, but to inspire social change.” 5
Social change, to be sure, is not necessarily bad. But what if
affirmative consent is not biologically or psychologically sound and, for
that reason, women do not even desire it? Questioning the idea that
increasing women’s power will be desirable even if not founded on the
“the truth,” I ask: Can and should women — to say nothing of men —
say “no” to affirmative consent?
I examine this question in two parts. Part I evaluates the sexual
environment today from which affirmative consent has arisen. Part II
deals specifically with affirmative consent.
A few preliminaries: I wrote a piece in 2007 titled “‘Hands Off’:
Sex, Feminism, Affirmative Consent, and The Law of Foreplay” 6 which
is the basis for many of my remarks here. Anticipating that the subject
would be of wide interest because of the pervasiveness of sexual
intercourse in fact and in representation in our culture — and because of
the tediousness of so much other academic discussion — I decided to
organize a panel of fellow academics interested in criminal law and
feminism for a symposium at the annual Law and Society Conference
held last July in Berlin. Professors Donald Dripps, Richard Klein, Jane
Larson, Jane Moriarty, and I were the panelists.
As I see it, the defining moment of the conference — which serves
as another frame for this Meditation — came from the juxtaposition of
two dramatic images. Professor Jane Larson announced her support for
affirmative consent by saying that she never again “wanted to see a
woman lying back on the bed with tears running down her cheeks as
someone had sex with her.” To which I responded, having the Duke
rape case and my 30-year-old son in mind, “and I never want to see a
man’s life devastated through a bad rap from some vindictive woman.”
My almost reflexive riposte did not shelter me from the horror of
Larson’s imagery. Was mine, I could not help but think, just a brutish
male reaction? Does affirmative consent come down to whether our
concerns are with the man or the woman?
As I pondered the issue, my mind drifted to a young couple
sprawled on a secluded beach after a day of hiking, swimming, and
picnicking. He is a newly minted lawyer, she a legal secretary whom he
5. JOAN WILLLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT
244 (2000).
6. See Dan Subotnik, “Hands Off”: Sex, Feminism, Affirmative Consent and the Law of
Foreplay, 16 SO. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 249 (2007).
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met at work. He tells her that he cannot keep his eyes off hers, and when
she tells him that she wants to be admired for her character, he tells her
that he loves her forthrightness. She tells him that she loves his sense of
humor, and that she has never felt so comfortable with anyone, that,
indeed, she feels he can read her mind. The air is hot, sticky, and
pungent with sex as the man senses a hand brushing lightly against his
thigh.
Does this story have any sexuo-legal meaning? Should the law
treat the parties as if they had just met, say, on the New York subway?
To cut to the chase, if the man pulls off the woman’s bathing suit and
enters her, without protest on her part, is it rape? Here was yet another
frame for the issue at hand.
II. PART I
That men are generally more powerful than women politically,
socially, physically, and economically is a theme you will be hearing a
lot in this Symposium. There is no gainsaying this regrettable truth, and
I will not waste your time or mine trying to do so. But that is hardly the
end of the inquiry. For this truth leaves open to discussion whether
those gaps extend to the purely sexual realm, whether the damage done
to women from the lack of bargaining power is so great that the law
should intercede, whether affirmative consent is desired by young
women (as opposed to those who claim to advocate for them), and
whether the implications of buying into theories of women’s weakness
are simply too problematic for women to live with. Overhanging these
questions is the one implied at the outset: Why now? Why are reformers
raising affirmative consent when the power gap between the sexes is at
its narrowest?
My earlier article examines these questions, and I will try not to
repeat myself too much in these pages; interested readers can go to the
original. What I will do here is use the redoubtable, mainstream Robin
West to focus the analysis. Although Professor West has not, as far as I
know, explicitly endorsed affirmative consent, she provides the
philosophical foundation for its evaluation.
For West, the woman “defines herself as a being who ‘gives’ sex so
she will not become a being from whom sex is taken.” 7 What that
means as a practical matter is that “if a man wants to have sex and his

7. Id. at 253 (quoting Robin L. West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 149, 165 (2000)).
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female partner doesn’t, they more often will than won’t.” 8 West is not
queasy about providing details. “If what we need to do to survive,
materially and psychically, is have heterosexual penetration three to five
times a week, then we’ll do it, and . . . [w]e’ll report as pleasure what
we feel as pain.” 9
West goes on to explain why it is that sex can be so psychologically
damaging. Rejecting the idea that rape should be treated as theft of
services, she makes reference to her computer. When she sells or gives
it away, “[i]n no case does part of myself go with the thing so traded.” 10
Rather, West says, she holds her “self” back in order to “bask in the
glow of [her] beneficence or feel free of the burden of [her] now
disposed excess baggage.” 11
By contrast, she insists, when women “‘have sex’ or ‘make love,’ at
least ideally, they do not hold [their] ‘self’ back in this way.” 12 If and
when they do, and “consciously separate the ‘sex’ [they] are giving, and
hence [their] ‘sexual self’ from the self who will receive in exchange an
equal or greater value — [they] tend to think of that sex as being to some
degree injurious.” 13
Here, in short, are West’s basic — and grim — themes: Men are the
driving force in sex, and women, out of fear, will accommodate. When
they do so, they will not only do injury to themselves but they will also
delude themselves into thinking that the sex is pleasurable. Because it
involves the “self,” sexual relations should not be deemed a commercial
exchange.
West’s construction of sex is creative, if depressing, but is it sound?
Is the real young woman today as put upon and even handicapped in the
sexual marketplace as West makes her out to be? There is good
evidence, happily, that she is far from effete and sexless, far from, in
Billy Bigelow’s words, the “skinny-lipped virgin with blood like water/
who’ll give [her guy] a peck/ and call it a kiss/ and look in his eyes
through a lorgnette.” 14
The (black) woman in the earlier story admits that she generally
“did have control over” intercourse; 15 this is where she could exercise
8. Id. (quoting ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 110 (1997)).
9. Id. at 271 (quoting West, supra note 7, at 214).
10. Id. at 270-71 (quoting Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on
Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 1451 (1993)).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 271 (quoting West, supra note 10, at 1451).
13. Id.
14. RICHARD RODGERS AND OSCAR HAMMERSTEIN III, CAROUSEL (1945).
15. See Brooks, supra note 3, at 310, 315.
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power. “I’m a top, no doubt about it,” exults another writer in Sex &
Single Girls, an anthology of young women’s writing. 16 “I love seeing a
man’s lips red with arousal,” she continues, “his eyes, his nostrils dilated
with lust, and reminding him that there is no way in hell that he is going
to get to f*** me.” 17
If women can be successful gatekeepers under the most trying
circumstances, and thrill to the process, why let the gates down. “Sex is
my life,” reports another writer; “I know that sounds melodramatic, but
really, if I could be sure I would never have any kind of sex again, I
would take a quick header off the nearest tall building.” 18
A dispassionate scholar must not assume that the fifty articulate and
lusty women represented in Sex & Single Girls are representative of
young women generally. Continuing the evaluation of the philosophical
foundation of affirmative consent, then, I ask: is fear of rape as pervasive
as West suggests? Happily again, the answer appears to be no. In Sex &
Single Girls and Kathleen Bogle’s new study, Hooking Up, fear of rape
plays no role in determining when women have sex. 19 Data that I have
gathered and present below also shows that fear of rape is not the
bogeyman for women that it has been made out to be.
The idea that women delude themselves into thinking that they are
actually enjoying sex when they actually hate it—the “false
consciousness” problem—not only infantilizes women but also makes
impossible a rational evaluation of affirmative consent. A conscientious
and nonsexist male scholar is obliged to reject the argument.
We can now home in on West’s central argument that, because of
the nature of women’s sexuality, sex should not be thought of as a
commercial exchange. Here is the problem: If not like a commercial
exchange, how should we view sex? As a gift? But West’s measure of
sexual success or failure is whether the woman got back “equal or
greater value.” 20 That, however, is precisely the test of a successful
16. Hanne Blank, Confessions of an Unrepentant C***tease, in SEX & SINGLE GIRLS, supra
note 3, at 3.
17. Id. “[F]***ing for power’s sake is what I know best” writes another reporter in this
anthology; “[s]imply put, I use sex to f*** with things.” Karleen Pendleton Jiménez, Seductions of
a Bordertown Boy, in SEX & SINGLE GIRLS, supra note 3, at 87-88.
18. Karen Bullock-Jordan, Eternal Novice, in SEX & SINGLE GIRLS, supra note 3, at 232.
“I’ve never been one of those oh-sex-is-okay-but-what’s-all-the-fuss-about kind of girls. More like
the sex-sex-where-can-I-get-more-sex kind.” Lisa Miya-Jervis, A Celibate Sexpot Ties the Knot, in
SEX & SINGLE GIRLS, supra note 3, at 280-81.
19. See generally KATHLEEN A. BOGLE, HOOKING UP: SEX, DATING AND RELATIONSHIPS ON
CAMPUS (2008); SEX & SINGLE GIRLS, supra note 3.
20. Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1442, 1451 (1993).
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commercial exchange. Although she might well deny it, the computersale metaphor highlights even more explicitly the centrality of sex-asexchange for West.
I will not presume to contest West’s assessment of her own hedonic
sensibilities. I will, however, reject universalizing the idea that selling a
computer is easier for women because they are not soulfully invested in
their computers. Some women, I suggest — and maybe all women at
some point in time — are likely more attached to their computers, as
brain extensions, than to their sexual “integrity,” and may, therefore,
more easily surrender their sex. A personal computer, once gone, like a
brain cell, is gone forever. A woman can, by contrast, have her sex and
eat it too.
A theory of the body is not necessary, however, to cast doubt on the
idea that a woman’s perceived essence is in her genitals, that her sexual
needs are materially different from a man’s, and thus that the law need
not concern itself with the disintegration of the self through
depersonalized sex. Describing her one-night stands, Meg Daly writes,
“[I spent] half the time thinking if I slept with the guy it would lead to a
relationship, and the other half just acting from a blind and urgent need
to be touched.” 21
As for the college-age set, consider the widespread practice of
hooking up. While many women say that they hope a relationship
emerges out of the hook-up, the hallmark of the practice is “no strings
attached” sex. 22 If the hope does not materialize, the result may come as
a disappointment, and perhaps a reason to avoid hooking up in the
future, but that is hardly a mutilation.
The still larger problem in West’s analysis is implied by her use of
the word “ideally.” Yes, it may well be true that, as she suggests, sex is
best when the “self” goes with the flow — for men as well as women, I
would add. But we do not live in an ideal world. One of our essayists
forces us to face this. According to contractarian theory, she complains,
the law assumes that the “human agent has a free and unfettered remit
for individual self-determination.” That position is unsound, she
charges, so the law needs to replace “the image of unfettered selfdetermination with a more realistic account of the constructed operation

21. Meg Daly, The Allure of the One-Night Stand, in SEX & SINGLE GIRLS, supra note 3, at
194-96 (emphasis added). “[O]ne-nighters are not usually about knowing or even caring about each
other — they are predominantly about getting off.” Id. at 199.
22. See BOGLE, supra note 19, at 40, 49.
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of choice.” 23
The commentator is on the mark. Except in the most extraordinary
cases, we do not experience our basic functions ideally. We do not, for
example, eat, drink, and sleep ideally. 24 The very people who enrich our
lives often make demands on us that keep us from living exactly as we
like. 25 If we accept the proposition that one can give one’s “self” away,
then there is no basis for thinking that copulation is different from, say,
working. Questioning the idea that “the prostitute alienates her sexuality
[by providing] sexual services to a client for a fee,” distinguished
philosopher Martha Nussbaum asks, “Does the [opera] singer alienate
her voice” by selling her service? 26
It would seem, then, that there is no alternative to going back to the
world of exchange and weighing the quids and quos of sex. In this
connection, philosopher Alan Wertheimer has examined the case where
the woman does not experience the same purely sexual pleasure from
sex as the man. Ignoring the issue of how one might measure such
things, he writes, “little of moral interest turns on whether sex is . . .
desired,” for its own sake, or not. 27 Is he right?
Consider a woman who would “Rather Eat Chocolate” 28 than have
sex, who works as a receptionist and craves intellectual companionship
with a man more than she dislikes sex. She meets a nerdy guy who has
more than enough chocolate for his needs but has no one to be caressed
by or to caress. Must the law trouble itself if these two unhappy souls
come together? Here, it would seem, is a “commercial” arrangement at
its best.
Of course, the woman may find sexual activity with a particular
man or the idea of sex with men to be repulsive. The good news is that
the power gap has narrowed considerably in recent decades. A woman
today is much more likely to have the educational and financial
resources to make it on her own.
23. See Vanessa Munro, Constructing Consent: Legislating Freedom and Legitmating
Constraint in the Expression of Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 899 (2008).
24. If we did, of course, the activities wouldn’t be experienced as ideal any more, that is, as
something to aspire to.
25. We are unlikely to get what we want from the law either. In the realm of law, writes
Thomas Sowell, “[T]here are no ‘solutions’. . . but only trade-offs . . . .” THOMAS SOWELL, THE
VISION OF THE ANOINTED: SELF-CONGRATULATION AS A BASIS FOR SOCIAL POLICY 113 (1996).
26. Martha Nussbaum, Whether From Reason or Prejudice: Taking Money for Bodily
Services, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 693, 714 (1998).
27. Subotnik, supra note 6, at 289 (quoting ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL
RELATIONS 158 (2003)).
28. See generally JOAN SEWELL, I’D RATHER EAT CHOCOLATE: LEARNING TO LOVE MY LOW
LIBIDO (2007).
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In the hook-up world of college students in particular, the argument
that the woman has to give sex because she has to depend on the man for
financial resources is an especially difficult one because each party is
usually expected to pay his or her own way. 29 How can affirmative
consent be justified when the sexual offer can be easily refused?
But now suppose that the woman is in a financially precarious
position — and for a number of commentators this is her normal state.
Is this where the law must intercede? Not, it would seem, according to
our panelist Donald Dripps. The distribution of financial assets is unfair,
he concedes, but so is the distribution of “erotic assets,” 30 and the law
should not redistribute the one without redistributing the other. 31
We can test this conclusion through the archetypal case of a blond,
down-on-her-luck, 35-year-old divorcee. The implication of would-be
regulators is that if Donald Trump comes courting she will be obliged by
circumstance to say yes. But, again, is that so? The woman offers
beauty, youth, energy. She is a testament to her mate’s vitality. If she
rejects him, he looks like a fool. If not, she becomes his trophy. You
have to earn trophies.
Yes, the woman may well eventually have to sleep with a man if
she wants to possess him for herself. But as Wertheimer and others have
argued — and only one commentator seems to have contested 32 — a
man may well have a moral right to condition a relationship with a
woman on sex. 33 If affirmative consent enthusiasts think otherwise, they
need to say so.
Far from strengthening the affirmative consent argument, it should
be clear by now that male sexual hunger for women actually weakens it.
Desperate people are normally in a weaker bargaining position and thus
have to forfeit something of value.
Women have surely leveraged flesh as successfully as men have
leveraged money in the real world. Would there even be a market for
diamonds and furs absent men’s sexual hunger? The long-time editorin-chief of Cosmopolitan magazine, Helen Gurley Brown (perhaps the
29. See BOGLE, supra note 19 at 170-71.
30. A folk expression common in Uruguay phrases this more poetically: “La chocha tiene màs
fuerza que un par de bueyes” (The female genitals are more powerful than a yoke of oxen).
31. Subotnik, supra note 6, at 284-85 (quoting Donald Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the
Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780,
1786, 1790-91 (1992)).
32. Mary Jo Frug has suggested that a husband should not be able to divorce his wife on the
grounds that she does not provide sex. See Mary Jo Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto
(An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1066 (1992).
33. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 27, at 158..
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reigning expert on unmarried sex and women’s consumption patterns),
has long been teaching women exactly how to extract the maximum
from sexual intercourse: “If there’s a man who might be up for having
sex with you,” she urges, “take him to Gucci.” 34
That women have been able to exact some payoff for the sex they
“give” does not necessarily mean that, on balance, they have not gotten
the shaft. Indeed, there is evidence that women do not bargain as well as
men in some settings. 35 Does a bargaining gap create a problem
requiring the law’s intervention? Are women so fettered by male power
that they fail to recover the full “cost” of the sex they are giving up?
Laura Kipnis, at least, does not think so. “Pricey dinners, diamond
rings,” writes the Northwestern University professor of media studies,
“. . . in what other system of exchange can you trade exclusive access to
an orifice for a suburban split-level and a lifetime of monetary
support?” 36 “Not such a bad deal,” she concludes, “considering the
backbreaking and alienated things that a lot of people end up doing for
money.” 37
The best answer to the question of women’s vulnerability in the
sexual marketplace, may, in the final analysis, be a simpler one. And
that answer presents a major problem for affirmative consent enthusiasts:
If, indeed, lacking male power, women are forced to glom onto any guy
who shows interest, why did this tragic situation not come to light
centuries, or even millennia ago when women, as we understand things
now, had no power? Because it didn’t serve the interests of men and
women were not encouraged to write for most of that time?
Maybe. But why does Jane Austen give no hint of women’s
powerlessness? Although Elizabeth Bennett’s family has little money,
Mr. Collins has a sinecure and stands to inherit the property the Bennetts
live on, and Elizabeth is getting older, Elizabeth rejects Collins’s
proposals of marriage not once, but twice. 38
That was then, to be sure; this is now. That is literature; this is real
life. So consider a few narrowly-tailored questions: (a) If lower-class
women are the most vulnerable to sexual duress, why do upper-class

34. Subotnik, supra note 6, at 286 n.263 (quoting Helen Gurley Brown, Don’t Give Up on Sex
After 60, NEWSWEEK, May 29, 2000, at 55).
35. See, e.g., LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LESCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND
THE GENDER DIVIDE ix (2003).
36. Subotnik, supra note 6, at 287-88 (quoting LAURA KIPNIS, THE FEMALE THING: DIRT,
SEX, ENVY, VULNERABILITY 123 (2006)).
37. Id. at 288 (quoting KIPNIS, supra note 36, at 123).
38. See generally JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE (1813).
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women have the most premarital sex today; 39 (b) Is there one unmarried
male heterosexual reader out there who has not been rejected for both
short- and long-term relationships with a woman; and just in case the
same women have been doing all the rejecting in the latter case; (c) Are
there female readers out there who have not said “no” to a man—
recently?
III. PART II
Although by no means a majority movement in the legal academy,
affirmative consent has attracted a number of eminent and strong
supporters. Included in this group are law professors Michelle
Anderson, Ian Ayres, Katharine Baker, Linda Hirshman, Jane Larson,
Catharine MacKinnon, Ilene Seidman, Stephen Schulhofer, and Andrew
Taslitz. 40
Besides preventing misunderstandings about intention, affirmative
consent would, according to some of these sponsors, give the woman
breathing space during a rush to coition. This would allow her not only
to carefully consider whether she really wants to proceed, but also to
negotiate a better deal for herself, which might include more sexual
pleasure or perhaps a greater commitment from the man. Sounds like a
commercial exchange again.
Affirmative consent comes in two basic forms: hard and soft. The
former would require clear verbal consent by the woman while the latter
would allow consent through action, as long as, again, the consent was
clear. For some reformers, the consent would have to be obtained not
only along the way, but also before penetration. 41 Whatever the test,
“[s]ilence and ambiguity would be construed against the intruder” and
“only positive and clear agreement” to sex would count. 42
We should be able to agree that affirmative consent will not be of
much use in eliminating unwanted sex. To the extent that the man holds
the reins of power in the relationship, the effect of affirmative consent
will be minimal. The same forces acting on the woman will induce her

39. SAMUEL JANUS, PHD & CYNTHIA JANUS, MD, THE JANUS REPORT ON SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
323 (1993) (“Upper-income women reported having the most premarital sexual experience,
compared to low- and middle-income women . . . .”).
40. Subotnik, supra note 6, at 257, 272-78.
41. Id. at 274 (quoting Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the
Next Thirty Years of Rape Law Reform, 38 SUFF. U. L. REV. 467, 490 (2005)).
42. Id. at 261 (quoting LINDA R. HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE
POLITICS OF SEX 271 (1998)).
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to consent affirmatively instead of silently. In that respect she is likely
to feel even worse, having contributed to her own “victimization.”
That affirmative consent cannot be the end-all solution to unwanted
sex, however, is not the only test of its usefulness. A major goal of
affirmative consent, as we have seen, is to limit men’s ability to exploit
ambiguity in sexual matters. This, however, seems not to be a
significant problem. Most of the time, says the experienced female
prosecutor Linda Fairstein, “the signals that the victim has given,
whether verbally or physically, are very clear. There is little rape that is
due to failure to communicate, in fact.” 43
And, arguably, a woman can normally say “no”—and resist. “I
have never had a case,” says Fairstein, “in which the only expression of
lack of consent was verbalization of the word ‘no,’ without any display
of force or threats by the aggressor.” 44 In short, a woman can and will
resist if at all possible.
If we are not going to allow Fairstein the last word on the subject, it
may be very hard to satisfy critics that sex is preceded by true consent.
Some of the panelists here will almost surely identify with Catharine
MacKinnon. Since social and economic “inequalities are coercive
conditions,” MacKinnon writes, force should be defined to “include
inequalities of power.” 45 In particular, MacKinnon suggests that the law
assume “that money is a form of force in sex.” 46 That, however, would
mean that no number of Molly Bloom’s “yeses” could protect a sexually
active Bill Gates from a charge of rape. Without concerning ourselves
with Bill Gates’ needs, is that what women want for themselves? Are
women so weak-kneed that they must invoke the law to keep Gates at
bay?
Happily, most affirmative consent promoters have a less rigid
standard for determining legal copulation. “A man can choose to
progress slowly,” Taslitz advises, “getting to know her better.” 47 He can
“directly ask [the woman] about her thoughts, feelings and desires.” 48
Michelle Anderson, the most published proponent of affirmative
43. Id. at 294 (quoting Linda Fairstein, Panel Discussion: Men, Women and Rape, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 171 (1994)).
44. Id. at 264 (quoting Fairstein, supra note 43, at 161).
45. Id. at 278 (quoting CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 247
(2005)).
46. Id (quoting MACKINNON, supra note 45, at 248) (“The assumption that money provides or
shows consent to sex would be replaced by the assumption that money is a form of force in sex.”).
47. Id. at 274 (quoting Andrew E. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On Date Rape and SelfDeception, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 381, 437 (2005)).
48. Id.
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consent, proposes this test: “Did the person who initiated the sexual
penetration negotiate with his partner and thereby come to an agreement
that sexual penetration should occur?” 49 Did the negotiation “minimally
require a request for information about another person’s desires and
boundaries . . . . [?]” 50 In other words, did it express a “willingness to
consider the other person’s inclination and humanity[?]” 51
For Anderson, affirmative consent would ensure that the woman
was not reacting to male aggressiveness with “peritraumatic
disassociation,” that is, “frozen fright in response to sexual trauma.” 52
These are wonderful sentiments and, one could argue, should be
incorporated into practice. But into the legal system? Would women
want that? “[M]illions of women,” says Professor Catherine Wells, “do
not seek. . . the kind of communicative sexual relations” that reformers
are pushing for. 53
I can perhaps speak more authoritatively for these more-action,
less-talk folks than Wells can. In an effort to determine how much
agency Americans seek in their sexual activities, and skeptical of all the
high theory on the subject, I formulated a questionnaire for distribution
in a variety of Touro Law classes. 54 Respondents were made up of 143
women and 170 men.
The questions are based on a scenario in which, after several dates
involving dinner and drinks, Sam and Vivian end up smooching on
Vivian’s couch. I then presented a dozen alternate and rather graphic
mini-scenes and asked whether Sam has either acted immorally or
committed what students would want to see treated as a felony. I also
asked women whether rape was a major concern in their lives. Here are
some of the questions:
Question 3: After placing his hand on her genital area and meeting no
resistance, Sam has placed his finger inside Vivian.
Question 4: After placing his finger inside Vivian and meeting no
resistance, but receiving no express or physical evidence of consent,
Sam proceeds to intercourse with Vivian. 55

49. Id. at 275 (quoting Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1423
(2005)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting Anderson, supra note 49, at 1429, 1432).
53. Id. at 295 (quoting Catherine Pierce Wells, Date Rape and the Law: Another Feminist
View, in DATE RAPE 41, 48 (Leslie Francis ed., 1996)).
54. Id. at 300-02.
55. Id. at 300.
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In Question 3, 23% of women and 14% of men thought the action
should be criminalized; 24% of women and 25% of men thought it was
immoral.
In Question 4, 23% of women and 11% men thought the action
should be criminalized; 39% of women and 25% of men thought it was
immoral.
The threshold for majority criminal condemnation by men and
women came in another question in which Vivian pushes Sam’s hand
away and Sam put his hand back in. But even there the majority for
criminalization is a bare one for men and women (51% of women and
54% of men).
As for rape fear, only 6% of Touro women responded that rape is a
constant concern; more said that they rarely or never think about being
raped themselves (60%) than said that rape is a frequent or occasional
concern (40%). 56
The lessons seem apparent — to me at least. Touro women are not
afraid of “frozen fright in response to the sexual trauma” of a man taking
liberties with their bodies. 57 Fear of rape does not discourage them from
allowing a certain amount of aggressiveness on the part of the men they
date, or likely, from wanting it. That women seem happy with the way
things are would seem to deserve as much respect as any other of their
desires. Women have been deprived of autonomy for far too long.
In short, affirmative consent enthusiasts seem to have ignored
something fundamental. In her reading of the academic sex literature,
says Harvard Law’s Janet Halley, “I have not found anyone determined
to produce a theory or politics of women’s heterosexual desire for
masculinity in men.” 58 Maybe, perhaps unlike those who advocate on
their behalf, young women today actually like sex.
That the law students are not on the same page as affirmative
consent proponents may be even more manifest in their answer to
another question. Suppose after the circumstances of Question 4 above,
I asked, Vivian does not resist but tells Sam that she is not ready for
intercourse, and Sam proceeds to intercourse with Vivian, who again
does not resist. In that scenario, only 60% of women would criminalize
Sam’s action.
We cannot be sure whether these responses would be different in
other survey settings; law students generally are surely not representative
56. Id. at 304.
57. Id. at 275 (quoting Anderson, supra note 49, at 1432).
58. Id. at 271 (quoting JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK
FROM FEMINISM 65 (2006) (emphasis in original).
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of the entire population. What we do know is how women today show
their acquiescence to sexual relations. A study by two well-known
psychologists several years ago investigated this matter for both men and
women. Data were collected using the following alternatives: direct
verbal, direct nonverbal, indirect verbal, indirect nonverbal, and no
response.
None of the five categories captured a majority of the votes, but
men and women respondents reported that “they most often showed their
consent to sexual intercourse by making no response.” 59 What this
means, the authors lamented, is that there are numerous partners of both
sexes who are “letting their partner undress them, not stopping their
partner from kissing or touching them, not saying no.” 60
Why didn’t the women in this group respond with more gusto to the
sex that was offered? Analyzing this question may well help us home in
on women’s thinking. In a study of why women sometimes say no when
they mean yes, two women psychologists were told of “fear of appearing
promiscuous,” “uncertainty of the partner’s feelings,” “[e]motional,
religious or moral reasons,” “wanting men to beg” (the reader is asked to
especially remember this one), 61 “self-consciousness/embarrassment
about the body,” and “desire to be the one in control.” 62 Not responding
affirmatively to a man’s sexual overtures, that is, playing the passive
role, would allow the woman to accomplish all these purposes.
Drinking, discussed later in this Symposium, 63 would allow women to
dissociate from the act in another way: “It wasn’t me, it was the
alcohol.” 64
But there is more to say because men also showed their consent by
letting themselves be undressed. Feminists are right; sex is power. The
other side of the sex coin, however, is that sex is also powerlessness. 65
If sex is about screwing, it is equally about “getting laid.”
59. Id. at 299.
60. Id. at 299 (quoting Susan E. Hickman & Charlene L. Muehlenhard, “By the Semi-Mystical
Appearance of a Condom”: How Young Women and Men Communicate Sexual Consent in
Heterosexual Situations, 36 J. SEX RES. 258, 271 (1999)). This is precisely how Lady (Constance)
Chatterley manifests her consent. Id. at 262, 299.
61. See, e.g., Blank, supra note 16, at 3.
62. Subotnik, supra note 6, at 282-83 (quoting Charlene Muehlenhard & Lisa Hollabaugh, Do
Women Sometimes Say No When They Mean Yes? The Prevalence and Correlates of Women’s
Token Resistance to Sex, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 875-76 (1988)).
63. Sharon Cowan, The Trouble with Drink: Intoxication, (In)capacity, and the Evaporation
of Consent to Sex, 41 AKRON L. REV. 899 (2008).
64. See BOGLE, supra note 19, at 63, 167-69.
65. “I willingly abdicate my power, grateful for the experience of emotional release through
physical sensation. Silencing the chaos of my conscious mind,” writes an S/M devotee, “I allow my
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Can anyone honestly disagree? Surely, no one will hold that taking
one’s own clothes off is more erotically charging than being undressed
by a partner. If control were the touchstone in our sex lives, would we
not self-actualize through masturbation? Indeed, if maintaining control
were central to our sense of personal autonomy, would we not abjure
orgasm?
The dynamics of our love lives are no different. What does “I love
you” mean? Among other things, it means “I am thrilled to give myself
entirely into your care.”
That students in the study often fail to respond to sexual overtures
by a “direct verbal” response may also be triggered by something else
entirely, a desire to have sex that is purely biological. “Most of us,”
writes well-known author Cynthia Heimel, “would kiss the ankles of a
man who lets his passion overtake him to the point where he forgets all
the amenities. Call us weird, but we love that. Passion – that feeling
that a man wants us so badly he can hardly breathe – is the ultimate
aphrodisiac.” 66
There are two more strikes against affirmative consent. No writer
likes to admit that he is not telling readers anything that they do not
already know. And yet, for my first argument’s sake, I must concede the
point.
In contemporary culture, when a man has a sexual interest in a
woman, he asks her out for a drink. (It works in reverse, of course, as
well.) Both parties understand what is going on — that he wants to bed
her and that her acceptance of the offer is an indication that she is not
averse to the idea, at least in principle. If all goes well that day, that
week, that month, the parties will normally be providing increasing
prospects of interest. At some point the man will invite the woman to
his apartment for a nightcap. What the parties are not likely to do at any
time is to set forth unambiguously what they have in mind.
Why? Our earlier discussion is relevant. A fuller answer would
seem to require consciousness of the fact that much of the time we
human beings live in a daze, and this is not because we are taking drugs,
but because we don’t like to face one aspect of life or another. This
mental state is especially common where our creatureliness is concerned.
The euphemisms for our excretory functions are too well known to need
elaboration here. Our mortality is no easier to confront than our toilet
physical senses to take over and celebrate the ability to feel, this gift of sentience.” Meg Weber,
Pleasing Alex, in SEX & SINGLE GIRLS, supra note 3, at 35, 45.
66. Subotnik, supra note 6, at 294 (quoting CYNTHIA HEIMEL, SEX TIPS FOR GIRLS 81
(1983)).
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activities. Slaughtering animals for food is yet another activity on which
we prefer not to dwell.
Sex for many of us is similarly fraught with ambiguity and
ambivalence. That it is perilous to force consciousness of intercourse on
a particular partner cannot be clearer to sentient males: “If avoiding sex
is vaguely a part of your complex set of desires,” Professor William Ian
Miller teaches, “there is probably no better way of accomplishing it than
by coming on with ‘Hey, wanna f***?’” 67
It is not only the man who risks not getting what he needs when
engaging in frank talk. “[W]hen I put the words to it, when I say, ‘I
want you to f*** me, please . . .,’ then I can’t pretend that I just
happened to fall into this bed, oops!. . . . and that goes against everything
I was ever taught.” 68
Second, the case for affirmative consent proves too much. “I am
woman / I am invincible / I am strong.” 69 Helen Reddy’s iconic ode to
contemporary women has strengthened them. A growing number of
women, now occupying the top tier in economic and political pyramids,
are called on every day by employees, customers, and political
colleagues to make decisions. It simply cannot be in women’s interests
to sabotage the credibility of this vanguard.
Here is the point that might well be understood by the women in the
Touro survey. If the woman in the case above, 70 lacks the gumption to
say “no” to a man for sex, on what basis can she be expected to say “no”
to one who wants a job or a promotion, or who makes an offer to settle a
case for far less than it is worth to her client? Or to a Congress full of
men who want to, say, blow up the world or just deport wholesale
millions of undocumented workers?
Which brings us to the final question here: Why the affirmative
consent push now? It is clearly not, as suggested by reformers, that
women are politically, socially, physically, and economically
handicapped. Nor is there any evidence that men are acting more
aggressively with women than ever.
The real answer seems so simple. The feminists’ fulsome promises
of equality in sexual expression notwithstanding, 71 the cost of unzipping
67. WILLIAM IAN MILLER, FAKING IT 52 (2003).
68. Mary Anne Mohanraj, Silence and the Word, in SEX AND SINGLE GIRLS, supra note 3, at
294, 299.
69. HELEN REDDY, I AM WOMAN (Capitol Records 1972).
70. See supra Introduction.
71. See BOGLE, supra note 19, at 21-22. Among the noble goals of the sexual revolution,
wrote Kate Millett, was ending “traditional sexual inhibitions and taboos” and initiating “a
permissive single standard of sexual freedom.” SEXUAL REVOLUTION xxvi (Jeffrey Escoffier ed.,
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to women — whose sexual expression had been most constrained — has
been high. The increased supply of sex has limited female options.
“The reason [boys] can’t really understand why a girl says no,” a young
interviewee explains, “is because so many girls say yes.” 72
The erosion of young women’s sexual power can be seen just as
clearly in the increase in the marriage age 73 and in the drop in the
marriage rate. 74 The irony here is no less striking than the irony of the
most powerful women’s generation in history complaining of weakness.
That today’s woman may have to put out or be shut out is far from
ideal. 75 What is to be done? Reformers cannot call for celibacy, or a
return to the double standard, which they rightly and roundly
condemned. All they can do is try to regulate the market through
affirmative consent. But is that a fair response when young women
themselves seem unpersuaded, when for 10,000 years they have enjoyed
men begging for sex, and when the underlying problem is not men’s
political and economic strengths but rather women’s weaknesses? It is
not that women can’t say “no” but rather — not that there’s anything
wrong with it — won’t.

2003) (quoting KATE MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS (1970)). Lee Damsky thanks Helen Gurley
Brown, longtime editor of Cosmopolitan magazine, for giving “us permission to get laid.” Lee
Damsky, Introduction, in SEX & SINGLE GIRLS, supra note 3, at xi-xii.
72. SHARON THOMPSON, GOING ALL THE WAY 19 (1995) (quoting “Tracy,” a teenage girl
interviewed by the author).
73. Today’s all-time high American marriage age is 27 for men and 25 for women. See
BOGLE, supra note 19, at 2. In 1960, the median age for first marriages was approximately 23 for
men and 20 for women. Id. at 22.
74. In 1960, for example, 8.6% of women 25-34 in age had never married compared to 29.7%
in 2000. U.S. Census Bureau, Marital Status: 2000, at 9 (October 2003). In 1996, 16.4% of women
35-44 had never married. U.S. Census Bureau, 2006 American Community Survey S1201. The
television show “Sex in the City” dramatizes the point. The four thirty-something women are
looking for love, but often find only sex instead.
75. See BOGLE, supra note 19, at 71, 181-82.
[T]he sexual double standard . . . is still very much a part of the hookup scene. . . .
Women want ‘romantic’ interaction with men, but there are many pitfalls for them in
doing so. The catch is that a woman needs to hook up in order to find someone with
whom to have a potential relationship, yet her very participation in hooking up can mean
that she is not taken seriously as a potential girlfriend, is exploited for sex, and/or is
labeled a slut.
Id. at 181.
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